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Abstract 
I explore company characteristics which explain the difference in analysts’ recommendations for 
companies that were underwritten (affiliated) versus non-underwritten (unaffiliated) by analysts’ 
brokerage firms. Prior literature documents that analysts issue more optimistic recommendations 
to underwriting clients of analysts’ brokerage employers. Extant research uses regression models 
to find general associations between recommendations and financial qualities of companies, with 
or without underwriting relationship. However, regression models cannot identify the qualities that 
cause the most difference in recommendations between affiliated versus unaffiliated companies. I 
adopt uplift random forest model, a popular technique in recent marketing and healthcare 
research, to identify the type of companies that earn analysts’ favor. I find that companies of 
stable earnings in the past, higher book-to-market ratio, smaller sizes, worsened earnings, and 
lower forward PE ratio are likely to receive higher recommendations if  they are affiliated with 
analysts than if they are unaffiliated with analysts. With uplift random forest model, I show that 
analysts pay more attention on price-related than earnings-related matrices when they value 
affiliated versus unaffiliated companies. This paper contributes to the literature by introducing an 
effective predictive model to capital market research and shedding additional light on the 
usefulness of analysts’ reports. 
Key Words: Uplift Modeling; Analyst; Recommendation; Underwriting; Brokerage. 
JEL classification: C8; G2 
Introduction 
In this paper, I explore the company characteristics that explain different recommendations given by sell-
side analysts for underwriting (affiliated) clients and non-underwriting (unaffiliated) clients. Sell-side equity 
analysts are financial experts who work for the research department of large brokerage firms. They do 
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research on companies, write investment reports about stocks, and advise clients on trading strategies. 
Objectivity of analysts has been seriously questioned in the past two decades. Prior literature documents 
that analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are overly optimistic, because favorable 
opinions generate trading commissions (Irvine 2000; Jackson 2005) and underwriting fees (Lin and 
McNichols 1998; Ertimur, Muslu, and Zhang 2011) for their brokerage employers. While financial press 
blames analysts for intentionally misleading investors (Craig and Weil 2001), a few scholars argue for 
analysts in that over-optimism in earnings forecasts and recommendations is resulted from analysts’ 
censorship in covering stocks. Analysts report only well-performing stocks and drop inferior ones. If 
analysts were to continue following those low-quality stocks, they would express negative opinions, and the 
overall average of earnings forecasts and recommendations would appear less optimistic (McNichols and 
O’Brien 1997). Empirical evidence shows that the IPOs with more analysts’ coverage yield significantly 
better returns than the IPOs with smaller analysts’ coverage (Das, Guo, and Zhang 2006), and that 
favorable recommendations do not necessary win underwriting businesses for analysts’ brokerage firms 
(Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm 2006). Whether investors can trust analysts’ information is still an 
unsolved debate.  
Examining only the investment banking relationship does not render ground to say whether analysts’ 
reports are useful to investors. Stock prices are affected by many corporate information and macro-
economic events.  If analysts’ recommendations reflect value generating features of companies even under 
the brokerage business pressure, then analysts’ reports are still informative to investors. Extant accounting 
and finance research relies on regression models to find association between recommendations and 
affiliation. In a regression model, researchers use recommendations as the dependent variable and 
observe how the sign and the significance of the coefficient of the affiliation change as they gradually add 
control variables that are proved to be associated with recommendation in prior literature. Regression 
models allow researchers to interpret the association between recommendations and affiliation at an 
aggregate level, but they are incapable of detecting which control variables are most likely to cause the 
affiliated company to receive a favorable recommendation. Uplift random forest model is designed to find 
the most responsive subsample by combining decision tree and ordered logistic model. Uplift random forest 
model begins with developing decision trees by ranking the importance of control variables. Following the 
order of the importance of control variables, uplift random forest then predicts the probability of receiving 
good recommendations for affiliated and unaffiliated companies. Finally, difference in probabilities of 
affiliated and unaffiliated companies are ranked into quintiles, and researchers can identify the control 
variables that best explain the difference in recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated 
companies.  
Using uplift random forest model, I find that affiliated companies receive better recommendations than 
unaffiliated companies because they are smaller, report less volatile earnings, exhibit worsened earnings 
but higher book-to-market ratios, whose stocks are held by analyst’s brokerage firm, followed by more 
analysts, and have lower forecasted price-to-earnings ratios. The results also show that the difference in 
likelihood of receiving favorable recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated companies is larger 
after 2002, the year when regulatory reforms of investment banking industry were enacted. These findings 
imply that even under investment banking business pressure, analysts still value measures that reveal 
prospect of the company.   
My paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, most of papers examining associations between 
analysts’ outputs and analysts’ incentives provide a general conclusion without looking further into how 
financial characteristics of companies affect the association between analysts’ research outputs and 
incentives. This paper is the first to investigate factors that contribute to the span of analysts’ 
recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated companies. I show that analysts, albeit under pressure 
of brokerage businesses, still rank stocks according to critical financial indicators of companies. My findings 
shed additional light in the debate of usefulness of analysts’ reports in that analysts appear to strive to be 
objective, and analysts’ reports are useful to investors. Second, I introduce a new method to capital 
markets research. Uplift random forest model is known for detecting qualities of subjects that are most 
responsive to treatment such as a promotional program and a drug, and the methodology is popular in 
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marketing and health care research. My initial effort of applying uplift random forest model to analysts’ 
recommendations shows that this technique can be used in other capital market research areas such as 
regulation effects, audit testing, and corporate governance mechanisms… etc.     
In the next section, I review literature of sell-side equity analysts and uplift random forest model. In the 
section of methodology, I explain the construction of sample and variables and implementation of uplift 
random forest model. Results are reported in the fourth section, followed by the conclusion. 
Literature Review 
Analysts’ Reports and Incentives 
Prior literature documents that analysts’ research reports are informative to market as the stock price 
moves around the day when the analyst revises his/her earnings forecasts (Lys and Sohn 1990), and the 
stock price moves in the same direction as the recommendations are updated (Stickel 1995). Analysts are 
supposed to provide objective information about stocks to investors. However, since majority of analysts 
are employed by brokerage firms, analysts’ message on research reports is inevitably affected by their 
employers’ businesses. Brokerage firms make revenues primarily out of three sources: trading 
commissions, underwriting fees, and M&A advising fees. Anecdotal stories tell us that analysts strive to 
develop good relationship with trading clients (Lauricella 2001), because the quicker and the more private 
information analysts can provide for institutional investors, the more likely institutional investors vote for 
“star analysts” on polls of Institutional Investor II Magazine or the Wall Street Journal, which is an important 
determinant of analysts’ compensation (Stickel 1992; Groysberg, Healy, and Mabor 2008). Since investors 
are pleased by analyst’s service, they are likely to place trading orders through analysts’ brokerage firms 
(Irvine 2007), which helps generate trading income for the brokerage firm. In order to gain access to private 
information, analysts would revise earnings forecasts and recommendations as corporate managers expect 
(Francis and Philbrick 1993; Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004; Feng and McVay 2010). Another 
reason why analysts please corporate managers is that debt or equity offerings of companies create 
underwriting income for analysts’ brokerage firms. When a company wants to go public, its name is usually 
not well recognized in the marketplace. By guaranteeing coverage and helping run the “road show”, 
analysts can help the new company find investors and sustain the stock price after IPOs (Bradley, Jordan, 
and Ritter 2003). Empirical evidence documents that sell-side analysts give more positive 
recommendations to affiliated stocks than to unaffiliated ones (Lin and McNichols 1998; Chen and Chen 
2009; Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2014), and affiliated stocks yield worse returns than unaffiliated 
stocks (Michaely and Womack 1999). Analysts’ underwriting incentives appear to be against the interest of 
investors. 
Despite ample articles attribute analysts’ biased opinions to underwriting incentives, some papers find that 
overly optimistic opinions are not necessarily resulted from underwriting businesses. McNichols and 
O’Brian (1997) argue that it is because analysts are inclined to follow better-performers, causing the overall 
average ratings of stocks to become optimistic. Empirical results of Eames, Glover, and Kennedy (2002) do 
not support the notion that analysts intentionally bias their information, because the psychology theory of 
“motivated reasoning” (Kunda 1990) points out that people tend to defend their choice by putting 
consistently favorable messages. Since analysts believe in their selection of stocks, they will give optimistic 
earnings forecasts to promote their choices. Comparing earnings forecasts and recommendations of 
analysts who are hired by independent research firms, pure brokerage firms, and bulge brokerage firms 
who also underwrite offerings, Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)  discover that analysts of bulge 
brokerage firms issue less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than analysts of pure brokerage 
firms. Similarly, Ljunqvist et al. (2006) fail to find association between optimism in recommendation and 
winning underwriting mandates. With mixed findings of the association between analysts’ research outputs 
and underwriting incentives, Bradley et al. (2008) turn to seek how investors view analysts’ relationship with 
corporate managers. Examining stock returns following IPOs, they find that the market responds more to 
recommendations issued by lead-underwriting analysts than those issued by co-underwriting analysts. 
Further investigation shows that investors perceive informational advantage outweigh the conflict of 
interests of the lead-underwriting analysts. 
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Since the literature is discrepant in usefulness of affiliated analysts’ reports, we need to look further into the 
difference in research outputs of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. If the spread of analysts’ 
recommendations can be explained by key financial characteristics of companies, then it is not fair to say 
analysts hamper the informational environment of the market.  
Development of Uplift Random Forest Model 
Uplift modeling is one of the relatively new branches in predictive modeling of decision science. The 
objective is to find individuals or subgroups that are most likely to respond to a treatment. For example, in 
direct marketing campaign, uplift modeling is used to select the customers who are most likely to respond 
to direct mailing. Radcliff and Surry (1999) first propose a decision-tree approach. The basic idea is that we 
split branches according to customer characteristics, and we identify the most responsive qualities of 
customers by calculating the difference in responses of subgroups. Lo (2002) improves the accuracy of 
identifying the target customers by estimating the probabilities of responses in the first stage, and then he 
uses the difference in probabilities between subgroups to find the most responsive qualities. Due to strong 
computation capability of machines in recent years, various machine learning algorithms are developed for 
uplift modeling. Among machine learning algorithms, machine learning ensemble methods show the best 
prediction performance. A machine learning ensemble includes multiple models, and it predicts more 
accurately than each individual model does. Evaluating performances of different machine learning 
ensemble methods, Soltys, Jaroszewicz, and Rzepakowski (2015) concludes that bagging and random 
forest are most suitable techniques for classification model, and random forest algorithm predicts more 
accurately than bagging.  
In the context of analysts’ recommendations, the literature does not tell us how company’s financial 
characteristics affect recommendations when the company was or was not underwriting client of the 
analyst’s brokerage firm. Since uplift random forest model is known for identifying the most responsive 
subgroup of the sample, I use it to find the financial characteristics that contribute to the most difference in 
recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated companies. 
Research and Methodology 
Data and Sample 
The sample recommendations are resulted from merging several databases. I download individual 
analysts’ recommendations issued between 1993 and 2014 from I/B/E/S. I begin with 1993 because 
I/B/E/S starts recommendation data in late 1992, and the number of observations in 1992 is small enough 
to be ignored. Because analysts issue recommendations for companies on average once a quarter, I 
retrieved quarterly company financials from COMPUSTAT Capital IQ. SDC Platinum provides equity and 
debt underwriting information. Following prior literature, previous underwriting relationship can affect future 
analysts’ research outputs as long as five years for IPOs (Ljngqvist et al. 2006; Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar 2014). Therefore, my underwriting data starts in 1988. Institutional holding in companies are 
downloaded from Thompson Reuters 13f Holdings database.  In order to calculate abnormal returns of the 
covered stocks, I download daily stock prices from CRSP. To prepare for uplift random forest model, I keep 
only the companies that are covered by at least two brokerage firms. Among the recommendations 
received in a quarter, I require that at least one recommendation is issued by the affiliated brokerage firm. 
The final sample is 420 observations, spanning from 1995 to 2011. Table 1 exhibits year distribution of 
sample  recommendations. 56.43% of recommendations are in 2008 to 2011. Because I/B/E/S does not 
provide names of brokerage firms, matching brokerage companies across databases lose significantly 
number of observations. I use names of analysts in recommendation dataset to find names of brokerage 
firms on Internet, and I merge recommendation dataset with underwriting dataset (SDC Platinum) by 
names of brokerage firms and CUSIP of covered companies.   
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Table 1: Year Distribution 
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Cumulative Percent 
1995 3 0.71 3 0.71 
1996 3 0.71 6 1.43 
1997 11 2.62 17 4.05 
1998 25 5.95 42 10.00 
1999 8 1.90 50 11.90 
2000 9 2.14 59 14.05 
2001 34 8.10 93 22.14 
2002 2 0.48 95 22.62 
2003 27 6.43 122 29.05 
2004 4 0.95 126 30.00 
2005 15 3.57 141 33.57 
2006 28 6.67 169 40.24 
2007 14 3.33 183 43.57 
2008 55 13.10 238 56.67 
2009 79 18.81 317 75.48 
2010 42 10.00 359 85.48 
2011 61 14.52 420 100.00 
 
Table 2: Industry Distribution 
SIC 
Sector 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
13 Oil and gas extraction 58 13.81 58 13.81 
15 General building contractors 19 4.52 77 18.33 
23 Apparel and other textile products 10 2.38 87 20.71 
28 Chemical and allied products 29 6.90 116 27.62 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 29 6.90 145 34.52 
36 Electronic and other electric equipment 12 2.86 157 37.38 
37 Transportation equipment 14 3.33 171 40.71 
38 Instruments and related products 6 1.43 177 42.14 
45 Transportation by air 3 0.71 180 42.86 
47 Transportation services 3 0.71 183 43.57 
48 Communications 18 4.29 201 47.86 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 21 5.00 222 52.86 
52 Building materials and gardening supplies 39 9.29 261 62.14 
53 General merchandise stores 2 0.48 263 62.62 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 60 14.29 323 76.90 
58 Eating and drinking places 2 0.48 325 77.38 
59 Miscellaneous retail 15 3.57 340 80.95 
60 Depository institutions 4 0.95 344 81.90 
63 Insurance carriers 18 4.29 362 86.19 
67 Holding and other investment offices 2 0.48 364 86.67 
70 Hotels and other lodging places 7 1.67 371 88.33 
73 Business services 33 7.86 404 96.19 
80 Health services 14 3.33 418 99.52 
82 Educational services 2 0.48 420 100.00 
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Table 2 reports industry distribution of sample recommendations. Most of my sample recommendations are 
for companies in “Apparel and accessory stores” (14.29%) and “Oil and gas extraction” (13.81%), followed 
by “Building materials and gardening supplies” (9.29%) and “Business services” (7.86%). 13.8% of 
recommendations are for “Chemical and allied products” (6.9%) and “Industrial machinery and equipment” 
(6.9%). More than half of the recommendations in my sample cover companies of intensive capital, which 
are usually “large” corporation with small growth rate. 
Variable Measurement 
I choose the variables that are documented to be associated with recommendations in prior literature to 
explore whether difference in analysts’ recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated companies are 
related to company’s financial characteristics. Because recommendations are the end-product of analysts’ 
valuation process (Bradshaw 2004), and past earnings help analysts predict future earnings and determine 
value of the stocks, my first group of financial characteristics is related to earnings. Since managers have 
incentives to avoid losses, and if analysts’ incentives are aligned with managers, then recommendations 
would be favorable and earnings forecasts would be meet/beatable (Brown 2001); on the other hand, if 
analysts are objective, analysts should view loss as a negative signal and issue a less favorable 
recommendation. I use company’s net income/loss of the latest quarter prior to analysts’ reports (LOSS) to 
observe the pattern of recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts.  I also include 
earnings momentum (EM) and earnings volatility (EVOLATIL) because earnings momentum is documented 
to be negatively associated with recommendations (Stickel 2007), and volatile earnings in the past make 
earnings forecasts difficult (Gu and Wu 2003). In addition, ROE, ROA, and change of earnings (CHE) are 
popular measures for company’s performance (McNichols and O’Brien 1997), hence my first group of 
financial characteristics contains these variables as well. 
The second group of financial characteristics is price-related measures of the stocks. Because returns of 
stocks affect analysts’ recommendations and forecast errors (Stickel 2007; Koch 2002), I use price 
momentum (PM) to detect analysts’ preference of stocks between affiliated and unaffiliated ones. Since the 
difference between book value and market value indicates growth opportunity of companies, analysts’ 
research outputs are affected by book-to-market or price-to-earnings measures. Prior literature documents 
that higher book-to-market ratio (Fama and French 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994) and lower 
forward-price-to-earnings ratio (Bradshaw 2000) are associated with favorable recommendations. As a 
result, I include book-to-market ratio (BM) and forward-price-to-earnings ratio (FWD_PE) in the list of 
financial qualities of the company.  
Finally, I select size of the company, proxies for earnings management, proxies for company’s information 
environment, brokerage firm’s shares holdings in the company, and the indicator of years after new 
regulations for analysts as the third group of financial characteristics.  Prior studies find that smaller 
companies earn higher returns (Dechow and Sloan 1997) and higher recommendations (Jegadeesh, Kim, 
Krische, and Lee 2004). I use total assets (ATQ) and natural log of market capitalization (LOGMV) of the 
quarter prior to analysts’ reports to represent sizes of companies. Because the market punishes companies 
for missing analysts’ forecasts, managers have incentives to manage earnings, and analysts who intend to 
keep good relationship with managers would lower earnings forecasts to managers’ meet/beatable levels 
and issue favorable recommendations (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Louis, Sun, and Urcan 2013). I follow 
Louis et al. (2013) to use Modified Jones abnormal accruals (Abnormal_ACC) to examine the different 
recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated companies. As discussed earlier, analysts compete for 
trading volume (Irvine 2007), if one’s recommendation is more favorable than the others’, his/her brokerage 
firm is more likely to win orders of trading a particular stock (Niehaus and Zhang 2010). Therefore, I use 
natural log of number of covering analysts last quarter (COVERAGE) to observe aggressiveness of 
analysts’ recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated companies. If analysts’ brokerage firms hold 
shares of the companies they cover, they should have incentives to promote the stocks, because favorable 
recommendations generate more trade volumes than less favorable recommendations (Irvine 2004).  
Following the same rationale, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find that brokerage firms’ holdings in companies are 
positively associated with recommendations issued by their analysts. Thus, I include an indicator variable 
(HOLD) to test whether analysts’ opinions in affiliated and nonaffiliated stocks would be different given their 
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employers hold shares of the covered stocks. Lastly, after accounting scandals and financial crisis in early 
2000’s, SEC and stock exchanges started regulatory reforms regarding management’s disclosure 
(Regulation Fair Disclosure) and analysts’ communications (NYSD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472). These 
new regulations are  aimed to curb analysts’ biased information resulted from investment banking 
incentives. As Regulation Fair Disclosure was in effect in 2000, and NYSD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 
were formally accepted by SEC in July 2003, analysts’ reports issued in and after 2003 should be affected 
by all of these new rules. The literature generally finds that analysts issue fewer buy recommendations 
after regulatory reforms (Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder 2007; Ke and Yu 2007), however, private access to 
management is still not completely shut (Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2013). As a result, I use an 
indicator variable (REG) to test whether regulatory reforms have an impact on difference in 
recommendations for affiliated and unaffiliated companies. Detailed calculation and variable names in the 
relevant databases are described in Table 3. 
Table 3: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Calculation 
Abnormal_ACC Abnormal accrual calculated 
by Modified Jones model. 
Modified Jones model (Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008). 
AFF Affiliation. AFF=1 if the analyst’s brokerage firm underwrote the covered 
company’s equity 5 years (IPO) or 2 years (SEO) prior to 
recommendation; 0 otherwise. 
ATQ Total assets. Total assets in million dollars (ATQ) at the beginning of the latest 
quarter prior to recommendation.  
BM Book-to-market ratio. Book value (CEQQ) at the beginning of latest quarter prior to 
recommendation divided by market value (PRCCQ* CSHPRQ )at 
the beginning of last quarter prior to recommendation. 
CHE Change of earnings. Earnings of quarter -1 less earnings of quarter -5 scaled by price 
at the beginning of quarter -1. 
COVERAGE Number of covering analysts. Natural log of the number of analysts who issue 
recommendations for the company in the latest quarter before 
recommendation. 
EM Earning momentum. The latest actual EPS prior to recommendation minus actual EPS 
of quarter -4 scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS of the 
quarter -4, times 100. 
EVOLATIL Earnings volatility. Standard deviation of earnings (scaled by the price at the 
beginning of the quarter) over past 20 quarters prior to 
recommendation. 
FWD_PE Forward Price-to-earnings 
ratio. 
Price of the recommendation date scaled by earnings per share 
forecasted for the coming fiscal year end.  
HOLD Analyst’s brokerage firm holds 
shares of the company being 
recommended. 
HOLD=1 if the recommending brokerage firm holds shares of the  
company at the beginning of the quarter of the recommendation; 
0 otherwise. 
LOGMV Market capitalization. (PRCCQ* CSHPRQ )at the beginning of last quarter prior to 
recommendation. 
LOSS Loss LOSS=1 if income before extraordinary items (IBQ) last quarter 
<0; 0 otherwise. 
PM Price momentum. Cumulative abnormal returns (RET-VWRETD) starting 6 months 
prior to the recommendation multiplied by 100. 
ROA Return on assets. Net income (NIQ) of last quarter scaled by total assets (ATQ) at 
the beginning of last quarter. 
ROE Returns on equity. Forecasted earnings per share scaled by book value per share at 
the beginning of the year. 
RECimq Recommendation issued for 
company i by brokerage firm 
m’s analyst in quarter q. 
Recommendation has 5 values: Strong buy (5), buy (4), hold (3), 
sell (2), and strong sell (1). 
REG Regulation REC=1 if recommendation is made on or after 2002; 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of variables. Recommendations (REC) on average are 3.25, higher 
than hold recommendation. The companies in my sample generally manage earnings downwardly as 
average abnormal accruals is -0.01. The size of sample companies varies widely as total assets (market 
capitalization) range from $12 ($49) million to $2,014 ($244,774) million, and average total assets (market 
capitalization) is $21,276 ($11,994) million. The proxy for growth opportunity (BM) is 0.37 on average, 
which indicates that my sample companies are generally undervalued. Average number of analysts who 
issue recommendations for the same company every quarter is 11.73, indicating the informational 
environment of these sample companies is good. The latest quarterly earnings is on average 23.57 percent 
of the earnings of the same quarter last year (EM) and -0.8 of the stock price (CHE), the movement of 
earnings exhibits moderately downward trend. The mean EVOLATIL is 2.91, which is about the same level 
as previous work (Louis et al. 2013).  Current stock price is on average 41.74 percebt of expected earnings 
per share of the coming fiscal year (FWD_PE), analysts are optimistic about future earnings of their 
recommended companies. 59% of recommendations are issued by analysts whose brokerage firms hold 
shares of the recommended stock (HOLD). On about 15% of recommended stocks experienced loss in the 
last quarter (LOSS). Cumulative abnormal returns for six months prior to recommendation (PM) is on 
average -4.62 percentage. Profitability of recommended companies is on average 0.01 and 0.14 of total 
assets and stockholders’ equity respectively. 77% of my sample recommendations are issued in or after 
2003 (REG). 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Min. Median Max. Std. 
Abnormal_ACC -0.01 -0.31 0.00 0.71 0.07 
ATQ ($million) 21,276.22 12.38 3,360.38 2,014,019.00 140,844.92 
BM 0.37 0.02 0.33 1.42 0.26 
CHE -0.80 -68.10 0.10 11.93 7.12 
COVERAGE 2.29 0.00 2.40 3.50 0.67 
# Analysts 11.73 1.00 11.00 33.00 6.15 
EM 23.57 -900.00 0.00 3,400.00 418.97 
EVOLATIL 2.91 0.09 0.82 154.95 13.23 
FWD_PE 41.74 -262.00 19.65 1,021.32 101.61 
HOLD 0.59 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
LOGMV 8.07 3.90 8.10 12.41 1.65 
MV 11,994.60 49.42 3,292.46 244,773.98 30,424.58 
LOSS 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 
PM -4.62 -183.75 -5.88 221.82 40.03 
ROA 0.01 -0.72 0.01 0.11 0.06 
ROE 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.49 0.10 
REC 3.52 1.00 3.00 5.00 1.01 
REG 0.77 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 
 
Uplift model 
The purpose of uplift modeling is to use the difference between treatment group and control group to 
identify the qualities that cause the difference. The treatment group is exposed to certain action while 
control group is not. The action can be a marketing campaign such as direct mailing or a therapy in 
medicine. Unlike traditional models such as OLS that maximized overall data fit, the uplift model maximizes 
the difference in responses between treatment and control groups.  The uplift model is defined as: 
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ܯܽݔ	∑ {்ܲ(ܻ = 1|ܺ) − ܲ஼(ܻ = 1|ܺ)}௒       
PT and PC are probability functions for treatment group and control group respectively.  Y is a binary 
response with a value of either 1 or 0. Y can be continuous variable for certain selected model forms. X 
represents predictor variables x1, x2, x3…xk.  
Random forest is one type of the ensemble methods to calculate probabilities of Y. It  randomly selects a 
fraction of data and grows a tree (mi) using k variables (k <= n, n is number of observations). Repeat this 
process to grow B trees and average all the individual trees to ensemble. Mathematically, this step can be 
described as:  
ෝ݉(ݔ) =
1
ܤ
෍݉௜(ݔ௞)
஻
௜ୀଵ
 
To implement uplift random forest model, I first convert the response variable, recommendation (REC), into 
a binary variable. RECimq represents a recommendation issued for company i by brokerage firm m in the 
quarter q. ܴܧܥప௤തതതതതതതത  is the average recommendation across all brokerage firms for company i in quarter q. The 
binary response variable Yimq is defined as: 
 
௜ܻ௠௤ = ቊ
1	, ݂݅	ܴܧܥ௜௠௤ >	ܴܧܥ௜௤
0,			ܱݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁															
 
 
Second, I fit random forests uplift model using methods defined in Guelman (2014).  Kullback-Leibler 
divergence (Csiszar and Shields 2004) was used for tree splitting criterion. The model allows users to 
select the number of randomly selected variables for each node and the number of trees. The user can 
check the performance of uplift model by changing these criteria. In the end, I build 100 trees in total. I 
specify 5 randomly selected variables to test difference in each node.  
Figure 1 shows the difference in response variable, recommendation, between affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts. Consistent with scholars who argue that analysts’ research outputs are biased by underwriting 
incentive (Michaely and Womack 1999; Richardson et al. 2006), the recommendations issued by affiliated 
analysts are higher (4) than those issued by unaffiliated analysts (3). 
 
Figure 1: Recommendation between Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts 
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Figure 2 illustarates relative importance of variables in determining the difference in recommendations 
between affiliated and unaffiliated companies. The most important variable is earnings momentum (EM), 
which is about 36% of relative importance compared to all the other variables. The second important 
variable is earnings volatility (EVOLATIL), followed by natural logarithm of number of covering analysts for 
a company in a quarter (COVERAGE). After earnings and the informational environment of the company, 
analysts pay attention to price-related measures such as abnormal returns of the company in prior six 
months (PM), return on equity (ROE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and forward price-to-earning ratio 
(FWD_PE). Earnings management (Abnormal_ACC), size of the company (ATQ and LOGMV), ROA, and 
change of earnings (CHE) appear not as important as the other variables in determining the difference in 
recommendations. Unlike Ljungqvist et al. (2006) who find that holding shares of recommended companies 
affect the favorability of recommendations, the importance of HOLD is less than 1%.  In contrast to many 
prior studies that document new regulations for analysts’ communication effectively press down optimism in 
recommendations (Koch et al. 2013), my sample shows that regulations (REG) have very little importance 
in analysts’ decision process.  
   
 
Figure 2: Importance Score 
 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 3 shows the performance of uplift random forest model. The vertical axis is the average difference of 
probabilities between the group of “Affiliated companies receiving higher than average recommendation” 
and the group of “Unaffiliated companies receiving higher than average recommendation”. The horizontal 
axis is the quintiles of the difference in probabilities, one as the most different quintile and five the least 
different quintile. The steeper the slope is, the more successful uplift model separates the treatment and 
control groups. Apparently, uplift random forest model distinguish two groups successfully. I continue to 
calculate average of financial characteristics for each of these quintiles to explore the company qualities 
that make the difference in recommendations. 
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Figure 3: Performance of Uplift Modeling 
Table 5 reports means of financial characteristics in each of the quintiles uplift difference. The means of 
LOSS in the first two quintiles are larger than those of the last two quintiles. When the company exhibits 
loss in recent quarter, it is more likely to receive favorable recommendations from analysts if it is an 
affiliated company than if it is an unaffiliated company. This finding supports the notion that analysts’ 
research outputs are biased by underwriting incentives. The average of EVOLATIL increases as the 
difference in probabilities decreases. Analysts’ different recommendations for affiliated and unaffiliated 
companies highly depend on the volatility of past earnings of the companies. Comparing affiliated with 
unaffiliated companies, affiliated companies who have less volatile earnings are more likely to receive 
favorable recommendations than unaffiliated companies. ROA and ROE do not show a pattern with 
quintiles of difference in probabilities.  
The smallest ATQ appears in the first quintile of the difference in probabilities, which indicates that a 
company with lower total assets are more likely to receive favorable recommendations from the analyst if 
the company is affiliated with the analyst than if the company is not affiliated with the analyst. When the 
size of the company is measured by market capitalization (LOGMV), I also find that smallest companies 
appear in the first quintile. These smaller companies are companies of higher growth opportunities, 
because BM is larger in the upper quintiles than in the lower quintiles. My finding of analysts’ preference in 
companies of smaller size and higher growth opportunity is consistent with prior literature documenting that 
analysts prefer “glamour” stocks to “value” stocks (Jagadeesh et al. 2004). Change of earnings from last 
quarter (CHE) generally becomes more negative as difference in probabilities goes smaller. Analysts tend 
to give better recommendations to companies who incur less loss from last quarter. Earnings management 
(Abnormal_ACC) does not explain the difference in probabilities. COVERAGE generally decreases with the 
difference in probabilities. It is not surprising that analysts are more likely to give favorable 
recommendations to a company when they can see how other analysts rank the company.  Analysts whose 
brokerage firms hold shares of the reported company (HOLD) express more optimistic views about these 
companies. Consistent to Ljungqvist et al.’s (2006) finding, holding shares of the covered company 
indicates conflict of interest between analysts and investors.  Companies whose earnings are worsened 
(EM) are more likely to receive favorable recommendations. Less negative abnormal returns during the 
past six months (PM) in general are associated with higher likelihood of receiving favorable 
recommendations. FWD_PE shows that smaller forecasted price-to-earnings ratios are more likely to 
receive favorable recommendations from analysts. The year indicator variable of REG shows higher means 
in upper quintiles than in lower quintiles. After year 2002 when new regulations about analysts’ 
communication are in effect, analysts are more likely to give favorable recommendations to affiliated 
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companies than unaffiliated companies. Regulatory reforms appear not to be a significant determinant in 
analysts’ valuation process. 
Table 5:Financial Characteristics by Uplift Difference Quintiles 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
n 84 84 85 83 84 420 
Uplift Difference 0.46 0.36 0.24 0.09 -0.05 0.22 
LOSS 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.15 
EVOLATIL 0.97 1.54 2.41 5.85 3.84 2.91 
ROA 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
ROE 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.14 
ATQ 1,881.10 60,991.40 27,410.70 9,189.36 6,691.64 21,276.22 
LOGMV 7.10 8.00 8.50 8.41 8.37 8.08 
BM 0.31 0.39 0.50 0.38 0.29 0.37 
CHE -0.23 -0.08 -1.91 -1.41 -0.34 -0.80 
Abnormal_ ACC -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
COVERAGE 2.43 2.44 2.33 2.21 2.03 2.29 
HOLD 0.57 0.64 0.66 0.58 0.49 0.59 
EM -271.72 -137.66 16.30 252.35 261.39 23.57 
PM -5.72 -8.50 5.77 5.83 -20.45 -4.62 
FWD_PE 28.98 55.71 39.76 40.65 43.62 41.74 
REG 0.93 0.75 0.79 0.61 0.79 0.77 
 
Conclusion 
I use uplift random forest model to find the financial qualities that explain the different recommendations 
between affiliated and unaffiliated companies. I show that analysts put more weight on volatility of earnings, 
book-to-market ratio, number of analysts who follow the same company, and forward PE ratio in 
determining recommendations for affiliated versus unaffiliated companies. On the other hand, size, 
earnings, and abnormal accruals of the company do not generate significant difference in 
recommendations between these two groups of companies. Analysts’ recommendations communicate 
important growth-related matrices to the market, even though underwriting business pressure is present. I 
introduce a new method to capital market research. Uplift random forest model can effectively identify the 
most responsive subjects in a sample and can be applied to research seeking causal relationship. 
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